February 23, Wednesday 14:15, Room 303, Jacobs Building

Title: Cryptography Resilient to Memory Attacks

Lecturer: Adi Akavia

Lecturer homepage : http://people.csail.mit.edu/akavia/

Affiliation : Weizmann Institute of Science

The security of various cryptosystems in common use has been completely compromised by "side channel attacks", namely, by attacks exploiting leakage of information on the underlying secret keys. Such information leakage typically emanates from physical characteristics inevitably involved in real-world implementations of cryptographic protocols (say, power consumption, timing, or electro-magnetic radiation).

In this talk I will discuss *leakage resilient cryptography* . cryptographic protocols protecting against such side channel attacks. I will focus on the _bounded memory leakage model_ (with Goldwasser and Vaikuntanathan), a model capturing a large class of side channel attacks that laid the foundations for many follow-up works on leakage resilient cryptography. In this model the attacker can learn any (efficiently computable) function of the secret key, as long as its output length is bounded. I will exhibit public key encryption schemes resilient to such leakage. As time permits I will also mention extensions of these results to _unbounded memory leakage in distributed settings_ (with Goldwasser and Hazay).